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IN THE ARMY NOW: UNITED STATES v. REISER
William E. Hileman, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress is mandated by the Constitution "to raise and support
Armies,"' "to provide and maintain a Navy,"I "to make rules for the
Government and Regulation of the Land and Naval Forces,"3 and
"to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia,
. . . and training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress." 4 In order to fulfill these responsibilities, Congress
passed the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 19671 and
declared the following purposes, among others, for the Act:
(b) . . . that an adequate armed strength must be achieved and
maintained to insure the security of this nation.
(c) . . . that in a free society the obligations and privileges of
serving in the Armed Forces and the reserve components thereof
should be shared generally, in accordance with a system of selec-
tion which is fair and just, and which is consistent with the mainte-
nance of an effective national economy.'
Exercising this broad constitutional authority to raise armed
forces to provide for national security, Congress determined that
only male citizens were subject to the draft.7 Senior District Judge
William D. Murray of the United States District Court, District of
Montana, has concluded in United States v. Reisere that "legisla-
tion which limits the military draft to male citizens denies them
equal protection of the law"9 by creating an unjustified sex classifi-
cation.
In deciding whether or not legislation establishing all male
draft is a violation of the Constitution, it is necessary to consider
what justification exists for sex-based classifications and what stan-
dard the courts have applied in determining the constitutionality of
1. U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
2. U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
3. U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
4. U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 16.
5. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 451 et seq.
6. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 451.
7. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 453. "It shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United
States, and every other male person now or hereinafter in the United States who, on the day
or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place
or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and
by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder." (emphasis added)
8. United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975).
9. Id. at 1069.
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such classifications. This note will examine the Reiser decision and
measure the district court's approach to the problem against the
current state of the law.
II. U.S. v. REISER
Defendant George Kenneth Reiser was indicted for failure to
submit to induction into the armed forces.'" As the basis of a motion
to dismiss, Reiser contended that the statutory scheme under which
the United States had attempted to induct and prosecute him es-
tablished "a sex-based classification which burdens and penalizes
members of one sex and not the other."" As a result the defendant
maintained that his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, were violated.
The district court dismissed the indictment against Reiser, conclud-
ing that the draft laws were unconstitutional because they created
a sex-based classification that was inherently "suspect,"' 3 and that
the government had failed to show that "national security" required
exclusion of women from the draft or that there was any other com-
pelling interest served by such exclusion. 4
In holding sex a suspect classification, the district court felt
that a close examination was warranted "when experience indicates
that the correlation between the classification and the performance
in question is based on generalities which are not grounded in fac-
tual determinations but rather upon stereotyped conclusions. '"'5
Noting an historical similarity between classifications based on race
and those based on sex, the court, cautioned that "in view of the
misjudgments made about the performances and capabilities of
women in the past, any continuing distinctions based on sex (like
those of race) should bear a heavy burden of proof."' 6
This burden was then upon the government to establish that
the "gender-based classification" employed in the draft satisfied a
"compelling state interest."' 6 Viewing the "highly mechanized"
nature of modern warfare, the district court found that this burden
had not been met, especially considering the fact that only some
15% of the country's armed forces personally served in combat units
during the American participation in the Vietnam war.'7 The court
10. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 452.
11. United States v. Reiser, supra note 8 at 1061.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1063.
14. Id. at 1067.
15. Id. at 1064.
16. Id. at 1064-65.
16.1. Id. at 1065.
17. Id. at 1067, citing Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical
[Vol. 37
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felt that women, just as men, could be considered on their qualifica-
tions and assigned to noncombat roles if "any justifiable basis ex-
isted for excluding them from combat assignments."'"
III. EQUAL PROTECTION
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment sets a standard
to which federal legislation must conform. It guarantees to every
person security from arbitrary treatment and the equal protection
of the laws. In this regard, the Fifth Amendment imposes the same
obligation upon the federal government as the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does upon the states." Very early it was recognized that the
promise of equal protection of the laws not only meant the enact-
ment of fair and impartial legislation, but also extended to the
application of those laws.2 " The United States Supreme Court has
indicated that three factors must be examined in order to determine
whether a law violates equal protection: 1) the character of the
classification; 2) the individual interests affected by the classifica-
tion; and 3) the governmental interests advanced in support of the
classification.2' When examining laws challenged under equal pro-
tection, the Court has evolved more than one standard or test, de-
pending on the interest affected or the classification involved.2 2
IV. RATIONAL BASIS TEST
The traditional standard of equal protection scrutiny focused
solely on the means used by the legislature. Known as the "rational
basis" test, it merely required that the means or classification in the
statute reasonably relate to the legislative purpose.2 3 To meet con-
stitutional challenge, classifications, at a minimum, must be "rea-
sonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of differ-
ence having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike." 4 If there was a valid reason for the classification,
courts would defer to the legislature's judgment. Under this test an
act of the legislature is entitled to a presumption of constitution-
Abstract of the United States 260 (1970).
18. United States v. Reiser, supra note 8 at 1069.
19. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Cf. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, -U.S.
-, 95 S. Ct. 1225, 1228 n.2 (1975).
20. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886).
21. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
22. Compare Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), with
Williams v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964), with Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
23. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
24. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1919).
1976]
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ality;23 and one who assails the classification carries the burden of
showing that it "does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary."" Review of the propriety of the classfication
is limited to whether "any set of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it."" Using this test, then, the court need ask itself only
two questions: 1) Does the statute have a permissible purpose? 2)
Do the classifications drawn have a reasonable relation to this pur-
pose?
V. STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
In addition to the traditional "old" equal protection, a "new"
equal protection standard demanding strict rather than deferential
scrutiny has evolved. 2s Legislation subjected to strict scrutiny re-
quired a closer coherence between classification and statutory pur-
pose. Moreover, rather than regarding only the means, courts scruti-
nized legislative ends as well. Legislation in the areas of the new
equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" governmental
interests. 9 Strict scrutiny is triggered if the statutory classification
attacked involves either a "suspect" class or a "fundamental right"
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion. Suspect classifications have been held to exist when based on
race, alienage, and national origin.'" Classifications involving funda-
mental rights have included interstate travel, voting and freedom
of expression. 3' Strict scrutiny places "a very heavy burden of justi-
fication"32 on the defender of the classification to show not only that
it is reasonable, but that it is necessary to promote a "compelling"
governmental interest, or there is some "overriding ' 34 statutory pur-
25. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960); McGowan v. Maryland, supra note
23 at 425.
26. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 79 (1911); Morey v. Doud,
supra note 22 at 464.
27. McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 23 at 426.
28. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 H~Av. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
29. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
30. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) (race); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin); cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (na-
tional origin).
31. Note the holdings or rationale of Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (voting);
Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (freedom of expression); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, supra note 21 (travel, voting); Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors, 383 U.S. 663 (1963)
(voting); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, supra note 22 (voting); Shapiro v.
Thompson, supra note 29 (travel).
32. Loving v. Virginia, supra note 30 at 9.
33. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 29 at 634.
34. McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 22 at 192.
[Vol. 37
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pose. Here the courts must ask whether the statute involves either
a "suspect" classification or a "fundamental right."
VI. APPLICATION
Equal protection has been increasingly and somewhat aggres-
sively applied to invalidate sex-based classifications in determining
whether there exists a rational relationship between the classifica-
tion and the lawfully permissible object of the statute .3 Though in
form the traditional "old" standard is used, its applications has
sometimes invoked scrutiny of a substantial nature. The Supreme
Court recently stated: "dissimilar treatment for men and women
who are thus similarly situated . . . violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 3 1 In Reed v. Reed the Supreme Court held that classifica-
tions based on sex:
...must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike. 7
This language was used over fifty years ago in Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia38 to express the traditional scope of review on equal pro-
tection clause attacks against legislative classifications. Applying
the rational relationship test, the Supreme Court held that Idaho's
statutory preference for male applicants for letters of administration
of intestates' estates was established solely to eliminate hearings on
the merits of "equally entitled" applicants. Because the statute
accorded disparate treatment to individuals similarly situated, it
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Most cases invalidating sex-based classifications in sports have
also used the rational relationship test.39 The underlying policy in
35. Stanton v. Stanton, - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, supra note 19; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
It has been suggested that there be recognized a so-called "invigorated" rational relation-
ship test which calls for "modest interventionism." See Gunther, supra note 28 at 20-24; also
Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School District, 501 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1974). Mr.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 102-103 (1973), suggests that the Court openly acknowledge what he considers a
"sliding scale" approach: "The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion. As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional
interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the
degree of judicial scrutinty applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis
must be adjusted accordingly."
36. Reed v. Reed, supra note 35 at 77. See also Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110,
1113-14 (E.D. La. 1973).
37. Reed v. Reed, supra note 35 at 76.
38. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, supra note 24 at 415.
39. Brenden v. Independent School Dist. No. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973),
1976]
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invalidating sex classifications regardless of the test applied is that
"eligibility to play in athletic competition must be based upon an
individualized determination of ability to play regardless of the sex
of the player."40
The Supreme Court has exhibited a reluctance, however, to
expand the scope of strict scrutiny to include classifications based
on sex. Only in Frontiero v. Richardson4' has the Court approached
holding that sex-based classifications are suspect and therefore de-
serving of strict judicial scrutiny. A majority of the Court held that
the federal statutes permitting a serviceman to claim his wife as a
"dependent" regardless of the wife's financial status, but requiring
a servicewoman to prove the dependent status of her husband, vio-
lated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, only
four of the Justices held that sex-based classifications are "inher-
ently suspect." Since Reed and Frontiero, the Supreme Court has
had numerous opportunities to examine statutes which have been
challenged as sex-based classifications, but the Court has never held
that such classifications are inherently suspect.2
Even had a majority of the Court deemed sex as "suspect," all
classifications based on sex would not thereby necessarily become
invalid. Under careful reading, Frontiero stands only for the propo-
sition that administrative convenience is not sufficient to substanti-
ate classifications based on sex where such convenience is the sole
basis. 3
The district court's holding in Reiser that all sex-based classifi-
cations are "inherently suspect" is without precedent in the United
States Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit. Numerous courts have
considered direct challenges to the Universal Military Training and
Service Act on the ground that the Act is sex-based legislation
which unconstitutionally discriminates against male citizens. No
other federal court has rejected the authority of Congress to adopt
different requirements for men as opposed to women.44 Each of these
affirming 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972); Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472
F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n., 341 F. Supp. 258 (D.
Neb. 1972); Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E. 2d 495
(1972). But see Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D.
Kan. 1974) (sex classification held suspect and subject to strict scrutiny).
40. Brenden v. Independent School Dist. No. 742, supra note 39; Darrin v. Gould,
Wash. -, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
41. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
42. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, supra note 35;
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra note 35; Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
43. Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 41 at 690.
44. United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13, 14-15 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Bertram, 477 F.2d 1329, 1330 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v, Camera, 451 F.2d 1122, 1125-
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courts has imposed the rational relationship test and has found the
Act to be constitutional. At least two courts have ruled that
Frontiero does not require abandonment of the rational relationship
test to determine whether conscription of men only is a violation of
the Fifth Amendment. 45
CONCLUSION
Obviously Reiser is more than a draft case; fundamentally the
problem is what equal protection standard should be applied to sex-
based classifications. Contrary to the district court in Reiser, the
Supreme Court of the United States has refused to regard sex-based
classifications as inherently suspect. Rather, the appropriate stan-
dard remains the rational basis approach, which has been applied
vigorously. The question then must be whether the induction of
males only is reasonably related to the statutory purpose of raising
an army to insure national security. Courts have generally shown
considerable deference to the power and judgment of the Congress
in providing for the armed forces, even to the point of regarding such
power as "beyond question."46 Governmental interest here is seen to
be extremely urgent; "national security, in its true sense, is at
stake."4" Societal values and roles may be changing, as is the nature
of warfare; but for now the courts generally agree that subjecting
males only to the draft is not violative of the Fifth Amendment.
1126 (lst Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074; United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 623
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969).
45. United States v. Offord, 373 F. Supp. 1117, 1118-1119 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United
States v. Yingling, 368 F. Supp 379, 384-386. (W.D. Pa. 1973).
46. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
47. United States v. Offord, supra note 45 at 1118.
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